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Abstract 
 
Most explanations of stock market booms and busts are based on contrasting the underlying 
‘fundamental’ logic of the economy with the exogenous, non-economic factors that presumably 
distort it. Our paper offers a radically different model, examining the stock market not from the 
mechanical viewpoint of a distorted economy, but from the dialectical perspective of capital-
ized power. The model demonstrates that (1) the valuation of equities represents capitalized 
power; (2) capitalized power is dialectically intertwined with systemic fear; and (3) systemic 
fear and capitalized power are mediated through strategic sabotage. This triangular model, we 
posit, can offer a basis for examining the asymptotes, or limits, of capitalized power and the 
ways in which these asymptotes relate to the historical and ongoing transformation of the cap-
italist mode of power. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to outline a capital-as-power, or CasP, model of the stock market. 
There are two reasons why such a model is needed: first, the stock market has become the main 
compass of the capitalist mode of power; and, second, so far, we have not developed a CasP 
theory to describe it.2 
Surprising as it may sound, all long-term modeling of the stock market derives from a single 
meta-dogma that we have previously dubbed the ‘mismatch thesis’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2009, 
2015a). The basic premise of this dogma is the general bifurcation between economics and 
politics (a shorthand for all non-economic realms of society) and the further division, within 
economics, between the so-called ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ spheres. Finance in this dogma is a sym-
bolic nominal mirror that reflects the underlying real economy, but that reflection – and this is 
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the fourth CasP conference, ‘Capital as Power: Broadening the Vista’ (York 
University, September 28-30, 2016). Shimshon Bichler teaches political economy at colleges and univer-
sities in Israel. Jonathan Nitzan teaches political economy at York University in Canada. All of their 
publications are available for free on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives. Work on this paper was partly sup-
ported by the SSHRC. The paper is licenced under Creative Commons (Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 4.0 International) 
2 The theory of capital as power posits that capitalism is best understood not as a mode of consumption 
and production, but as a mode of power, and that capital is not machines or labour time, but the central 
power institution of capitalism. For readers new to the subject, Bichler and Nitzan (2012b) provides a 
short summary of CasP, Nitzan and Bichler (2009a) offers an extended articulation and Bichler and 
Nitzan (2015c) brings together a collection of recent articles. The past, present and future of the CasP 
project, including an extensive bibliography, are outlined in Bichler and Nitzan (2015b).  
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the key point here – is imperfect. Financial magnitudes tend to mismatch reality, and the pur-
pose of the model is to explain this mismatch and predict its consequences.3 
Our CasP model begins not by negating these conventional findings and predictions, but 
by giving them a totally different interpretation. The model suggests that underneath the eco-
nomic veneer of the mismatch thesis lies a power process, and that it is this power process – 
and not economic productivity and utility – that drives the stock market. This alternative inter-
pretation is important for three reasons: first, it gives rise to questions that conventional theories 
are unable to ask; second, it leads to findings that contradict the underlying assumptions of 
both mainstream and heterodox political economy; and, third, it might open the door for a 
better understanding of the capitalist mode of power and how it might be resisted and trans-
formed.  
The paper consists of eight sections. The substantive discussion begins in Section 2 with a 
bird’s eye view of stock-market booms and busts over the past two centuries. This section iden-
tifies some of the market’s quantitative patterns along with the qualitative power transfor-
mations that underlie them. Section 3 explains the mainstream mismatch thesis, while Sec-
tion 4 describes the valuation model of John Hussman, President of the Hussman Investment 
Trust, which, as far as we know, offers the best consistent predictions of long-term stock market 
returns. The remainder of the paper outlines our own model, illustrated by the enclosed Penrose 
triangle. Section 5 shows that one can re-
produce Hussman’s results by looking not 
at the utilitarian economics of production 
and consumption, but directly at capitalized 
power. Section 6 explores how capitalized 
power is dialectically intertwined with 
what we call systemic fear. Section 7 sug-
gests that the driving force behind both cap-
italized power and systemic fear is what 
Thorstein Veblen called strategic sabotage 
and speculates on how economic policy 
has been integrated into the CasP-driven 
stock market. Section 8 concludes with a 
brief summary and some thoughts about 
the future.  
Before turning to our argument, we should note that, although the principles we deal with 
here are general, our empirical analysis is restricted to the United States. Given this limitation, 
our article should be taken as explorative and tentative rather than exhaustive and definitive.  
 
  
                                                 
3 It is of course true that many practical investment models – such as those based on momentum, quanti-
tative analysis and index tracking, among other rituals – do not rest directly on the valuation of economic 
fundamentals. But all of them assume that, in the final analysis, capitalization mirrors and must eventu-
ally converge to these fundamentals. For bestselling manuals on valuation, see Damodaran (2011, 2012), 
McKinsey & Company et al. (2005) and McKinsey & Company et al. (2011). 
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mean
= 2.72
2. Major Bear Markets 
 
Begin with Figure 1, which shows annual U.S. stock prices since the late eighteenth century. 
The top panel displays levels, while the bottom panel shows rates of change. Prices are ex-
pressed in ‘constant dollars’, which means that, for every year, the nominal stock price index 
is divided by the CPI (Consumer Price Index).  
 
Figure 1 
U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars, 1791-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Shaded areas indicate major bear markets (MBMs) as defined in the text and in Table 1. Negative numbers in 
the top panel indicate the decline of the CPI-adjusted market price from the MBM’s peak to trough (trough year in 
parentheses). The U.S. stock price index splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and 
railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite 
(1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The constant-dollar series is 
computed by dividing the stock price index by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Data are rebased with 1929=100.0. 
The last data point is 2016 for the underlying series and 2011 for the 10-year centred average.  
  
SOURCE: Stock prices are from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1900 (series codes: _SPXD) and from Standard and 
Poor’s through Global Insight (GI) from 1901 onward (series codes: JS&PNS). The CPI is from GFD till 1947 (series 
code CPUSA) and from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics through GI from 1948 onward (series code: 
L64@C111). 
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Purchasing Power or Differential Power? 
 
Economists go through this transformation in order to display stock prices in so-called ‘real 
terms’. And what they mean by ‘real terms’ here is purchasing power.4 According to this view, 
each reading on the thin line in the top panel of the chart shows the purchasing power, denom-
inated in universal ‘utils’, of the owners of the largest U.S.-listed firms.5 For example, if the thin 
line rises by 10 per cent, that means that stock owners like Buffett and Soros can buy 10 per 
cent more groceries (measured in utils), or purchase 10 per cent more fuel for their vehicles 
(again, weighted in utils). Conversely, if this line drops by 30 per cent the implication is that 
the Buffetts and Soroses of the world can afford 30 per cent less clothing or can spend only 30 
per cent less on childcare (both counted in utils).  
Surprising as it may seem, this is the dominant view. In a hyper-liberal universe, goes the 
argument, every individual, whether a billionaire owner or a propertyless beggar – and by ex-
tension, every association of individuals, be it a corporation, a government, or an NGO – is 
ultimately driven by an innate desire to maximize hedonic pleasure, and the compulsive con-
version of all nominal measures into ‘real terms’ is a way of guiding and gauging this utilitarian 
obsession. 
But there is another, perhaps more meaningful way to think about this computation. When 
we divide stock prices by the CPI, we are computing a ratio between the prices of two baskets: 
a basket of listed corporate stocks and a basket of consumer goods and services. And if we think 
of relative commodity prices as reflecting the relative power of their owners, then what we 
measure here is not only purchasing power, but also differential power: the power of those who 
own stocks relative to the power of those who own consumer goods and services. So we have 
two measures in one: purchasing power and differential power, and in what follows we focus 
solely on the latter. 
 
The Stylized Facts 
 
So what does Figure 1 show us? First, it shows that, since the late eighteenth century, the dif-
ferential power of stock owners relative to owners of consumer goods and services has risen 
exponentially (notice that the top panel uses a log scale, so equal vertical distances represent 
multiples of 10). The mean geometric growth rate for the entire period is 1.28 per cent.6 If this 
number seems small, note that over the past 215 years it has compounded to a nearly 18-fold 
rise in the relative power of stock owners. The bottom panel of the chart shows the annual rate 
of change. The thin series in this panel displays, for each year, the growth of U.S. stock prices 
                                                 
4 Much of economics is conceived, theorized, measured and written in ‘real terms’. We enclose this con-
cept in inverted commas because, in our view, it is deeply problematic both philosophically and empiri-
cally (see for example Nitzan 1989; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Ch. 8).  
5 The term ‘util’ was invented by Irving Fisher (1892). Since this unit is totally fictitious and impossible 
to measure, contemporary mainstream economists pretend it to be theoretically unnecessary. In practice, 
though, they conveniently forget this pretention and use the util in pretty much everything they do. The 
reason for this organized, church-like hypocrisy is simple: the only way for economists to compute real 
economic aggregates (like real GDP and the real capital stock) or real economic ratios (such as those 
comparing the purchasing power parity or productivity of different economic agents) is to assume a uni-
versal unit of measurement; and in the hedonic world of economics, the only universal unit of measure-
ment is the fictitious util (Nitzan 1992: Ch. 5; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Chs. 5 and 8). 
6 The geometric growth rate is derived by taking the ratio between the last and first observation, raising 
this ratio to the power of 1/n (with n = number of years in the series less one), subtracting one and mul-
tiplying the result by 100. 
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in constant dollars relative to the previous year (with the mean arithmetic growth rate of 2.72 
per cent indicated by the horizontal dashed line). 
Each panel also show a thick series. In each case, the series displays the 10-year centred 
average of the respective thin series. Every observation in the thick series is the mean value of 
the respective thin series (level or rate of change) computed over a 10-year window. Since the 
moving average is centred, the window consists of the five years preceding the observation and 
the five years following it. For example, the 10-year centred average for 1990 is the mean value 
over the 1986-1995 period. 
The thick series in the top panel is useful in describing what we call ‘major bear markets’, 
or MBMs.7 In a market whose price trends upwards exponentially, the most dramatic event is 
a protracted crash, or MBM. We define an MBM as a period during which the following two 
conditions apply: (1) the 10-year centred average of the market price, expressed in constant 
dollars, is declining; and (2) every peak of the annual series is followed by a lower peak. Based 
on this dual definition, we can count seven MBMs (shaded in grey): three in the early half of 
the nineteenth century, three in the twentieth and one in the twenty-first. The top panel of 
Figure 1 marks the peak and trough years of every MBM, along with the total stock price drop 
in CPI-adjusted terms. This information is summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Major U.S. Bear Markets* 
(constant-dollar calculations) 
 
  
* A major bear market (MBM) is defined as a multiyear period during which: (1) the 10-year centred average of stock 
prices, expressed in constant dollars, trends downward; and (2) each successive sub-peak of the underlying price series, 
expressed in constant dollars, is lower than the previous one. Note that the peak/trough of an MBM can slightly 
precede/trail the inflection point of the 10-year centred average.  
 
The Quantities and Qualities of Power 
 
Now, when the market is booming, the popular media loves to insist that ‘this time is different’. 
The talking heads claim that something fundamental has changed, and that the good times can 
roll on forever. This point was infamously made in October 1929 by Irving Fisher, just before 
he lost his huge fortune, equivalent to $100 million in today’s prices, to the Great Crash 
(Anonymous 1929), and then again in 1999 by a couple of far-sighted analysts, who predicted 
                                                 
7 For the genesis, earlier versions and prior analyses of this concept, see Bichler and Nitzan (2008), 
Kliman, Bichler and Nitzan (2011), and Bichler and Nitzan (2012a). 
Period 
(Peak-Through) Decline (%) 
1802–1814 –56% 
1834–1842 –50% 
1850–1857 –62% 
1905–1920 –70% 
1928–1948 –53% 
1968–1981 –56% 
1999–2008   –52% 
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that the stock market would triple in five years, only to see it halved (Glassman and Hassett 
1999).  
The pundits like to ridicule these ‘new-order’ forecasts with counter-titles such as Irrational 
Exuberance (Shiller 2000) and tongue-in-cheek phrases like This Time is Different (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009). The market, they say, has its own natural, mean-reverting pattern, and there is 
nothing anyone can do to change it. And on the face of it, they seem to have a point. 
Figure 2 magnifies the lower panel of Figure 1, ignoring the year-on-year variations and 
showing only the 10-year centred average. This larger and cleaner exposition helps us discern 
three general patterns: (1) the growth rate of stock prices is not even, but mean-reverting; (2) it 
is not random, but cyclical; and (3) its cycle is not haphazard, but instead displays a fairly stable 
duration (though its amplitude in the twentieth century is twice that of the nineteenth’s). On 
the whole, then, the process certainly resembles a naturally reoccurring phenomenon.  
 
Figure 2 
Annual Rate of Change of U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars  
(10-year centred average) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Shaded areas indicate major bear markets (MBMs) as defined in the text and in Table 1. The U.S. stock price 
index splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock series weighed by 
Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite 
(1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The constant-dollar series is computed by dividing the stock price index 
by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The last data point for the 10-year centred average is 2011.  
  
SOURCE: Stock prices are from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1900 (series codes: _SPXD) and from Standard and 
Poor’s through Global Insight (GI) from 1901 onward (series codes: JS&PNS). The CPI is from GFD till 1947 (series 
code CPUSA) and from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics through GI from 1948 onward (series code: 
L64@C111). 
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But is it? Notice that, during the past century or so, every MBM was followed by a major 
creordering of capitalized power and a significant rewriting of the capitalist nomos.8 Thus, the 
MBM of 1905-1920 was followed by the rise of corporate capitalism; the MBM of 1928-1948 was 
followed by the rise of the Keynesian welfare-warfare state; and the MBM of 1968-1981 was fol-
lowed by the rise of global neoliberalism. In this regard, the first MBM of the twenty-first century, 
from 1999 to 2008, seems incomplete: although the capitalist system is already rattling, it might 
take another MBM to bring about a significant creordering similar to the previous three.  
Now the key thing about these creorderings is that they are qualitatively different from each 
other. So in the end, we can say that ‘this time – like every other time – is both similar and 
different’: the similar quantities of power are driven by different qualities of power. 
 
3. The Mismatch Thesis 
 
How should we make sense of these long-term patterns? As noted, the common and perhaps 
only theory on offer is the mismatch thesis. According to this thesis, capitalism – like any other 
economic system – is a mode of production and consumption that can be described and ana-
lysed in ‘real terms’ (i.e. in utils). When economists say that the economy grew by 5 per cent, 
what they mean – whether they are aware of it or not – is that there were 5 per cent more utils 
produced this year than last. This is the so-called real sphere of the economy. 
But the capitalist economy has another, financial sphere, and that sphere is denominated 
not in real utils, but in nominal dollars and cents. The stock market is part of this financial 
sphere, and it plays a crucial role: it acts as a giant mirror that reflects what happens – or, to be 
more precise, what will happen – in the real sphere.  
 
House of Mirrors 
 
Picture 1 illustrates how this mirror operates. According to the mismatch thesis, which can be 
traced back to Irving Fisher (1896, 1907), capitalists own machines, raw materials and 
knowledge that together make up the ‘real capital stock’ (top left quadrant). This real capital 
stock will produce, in the future, real income services (top right) that the capitalists will in turn 
sell for nominal future profit (bottom right). And the expectations of this future profit are cap-
italized by their owners, here and now, into present nominal market value (bottom left).9 Now 
if these transmutations are accurate, we have a match; if they are inaccurate, we have a mis-
match.10  
                                                 
8 The verb-noun ‘creorder’ fuses the dynamic and static aspects of creating order (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009a, especially Ch. 14). The word ‘nomos’ was used by the ancient Greeks to denote the broader social–
legal–historical institutions of society (Castoriadis 1984, 1991). The capitalist nomos is explored in Nitzan 
and Bichler (2009a: Ch. 9). 
9 According to Irving Fisher, ‘The statement that “capital produces income” is true only in the physical 
sense; it is not true in the value sense. That is to say, capital-value does not produce income-value. On the 
contrary, income-value produces capital value. . . . [W]hen capital and income are measured in value, 
their causal connection is the reverse of that which holds true when they are measured in quantity. The 
orchard produces the apples; but the value of the apples produces the value of the orchard. . . . We see, 
then, that present capital wealth produces future income-services, but future income-value produces present 
capital-value’ (1907: 13-14, original emphases). For a critical assessment of Fisher’s framework, see Nitzan 
and Bichler (2009a: 170-172). 
10 Although we do not pursue the following argument in our paper here, we should note that capitalization 
can neither match nor mismatch the so-called real capital stock, and for the simplest of reasons: this stock 
does not – and cannot – have a definite quantity to start with. As it stands, the capital stock comprises 
various entities, such as machines, structures, raw materials and (some say) knowledge, yet these entities 
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Fisher’s House of Mirrors 
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𝒏𝒓𝒓 × 𝜹
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
have no common unit with which they can be aggregated into a single magnitude (recall that the universal 
util is a theoretical and empirical fiction – see footnote 5). This impossibility was first pointed out by 
Veblen and Wicksell at the turn of the twentieth century, demonstrated by the Cambridge Capital Con-
troversies of the 1950s and 1960s, and reluctantly confirmed by the leading lights of mainstream econom-
ics shortly thereafter. However, since accepting this conclusion would have pulled the rug from under the 
entire edifice of economics, economists continue to insist that capital does have a ‘real’ quantity and that 
their discipline, although based on a logical-empirical impossibility, is still a science (for critical 
summaries, see Harcourt 1969, 1972; Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Chs. 5 and 8; Hunt and Lautzenheiser 
2011: Ch. 16). 
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Capitalization, Fundamentals and Mean Reversion 
 
Let us now narrow our focus and examine the final stage of this process, using the following 
notions in conjunction with Equations 1-3: 
 
𝐸 future profit ($) 
𝐺𝑉𝐴 gross value added ($) 
𝐻 hype (decimal) 
𝐾 market capitalization ($) 
𝑚 coeff. reflecting the future mean profit share 𝐸/𝐺𝑉𝐴 and future mean 𝐺𝑉𝐴 growth (decimal) 
𝑛𝑟𝑟 normal rate of return (decimal) 
𝛿 risk (decimal) 
 
Equation 1 conceptualizes the way in which investors capitalize future profit:  
 
1. 𝐾 =
𝐸 × 𝐻
𝑛𝑟𝑟 × 𝛿
 
 
In this equation the numerator represents expected future profit, while the denominator is the 
discount rate. The 𝐸 in the numerator is the actual future profit that will be earned. Since this 
future profit cannot be known here and now, capitalists have to guestimate it; and, usually, 
their projections are either too optimistic or too pessimistic. This optimism/pessimism is cap-
tured by the hype coefficient 𝐻. When capitalists happen to be right on target, 𝐻 = 1. This 
situation, though, is exceptional. Normally, capitalists are either overhyped, so 𝐻 > 1, or un-
derhyped, so 𝐻 < 1. The net effect of hype is to increase or decrease the profit that owners 
discount here and now relative to the profit they (or subsequent owners) will actually earn in the 
future.  
The denominator, which represents the discount rate, is also made up of two components. 
The first component is the normal rate of return 𝑛𝑟𝑟, which capitalists believe they are entitled 
to when investing in so-called riskless assets (such as U.S. government bonds held to maturity). 
The second component – the scaling factor 𝛿 – accounts for the additional return that capitalists 
demand in order to compensate for the relative riskiness of the particular asset in question (in 
this case, the risk of equities relative to U.S. government bonds). For example, if the normal 
rate of return 𝑛𝑟𝑟 is 0.05, or 5 per cent, and stocks are deemed twice as risky as government 
bonds, 𝛿 will be 2 and the discount rate will be 0.1, or 10 per cent.   
The problem with Equation 1 is that profits oscillate violently, so, for the purpose of pre-
diction, it is convenient to take a simplifying shortcut. Instead of estimating future profit di-
rectly, capitalists and analysts often start with the overall dollar value of production, or gross 
value added 𝐺𝑉𝐴, and then introduce two guestimates. Looking all the way into the deep fu-
ture, they project that (1) 𝐺𝑉𝐴 will grow at a certain average rate, say 5 per cent; and (2) that 
the share of profit in 𝐺𝑉𝐴 will oscillate around a certain average, say 6 per cent. Packing these 
two guestimates into a coefficient 𝑚, they can then derive market capitalization by looking at 
𝐺𝑉𝐴 and 𝑚 instead of 𝐸, with the hype coefficient 𝐻 denoting their excessive optimism/pessi-
mism regarding the magnitude of 𝑚. This new computation is shown in Equation 2:   
 
2. 𝐾 =
𝐺𝑉𝐴 × 𝑚 × 𝐻
𝑛𝑟𝑟 × 𝛿
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Equation 3 rearranges the terms of Equation 2. It shows that market capitalization is the 
product of two components: (1) 𝐺𝑉𝐴, which is relatively unambiguous, regularly measured and 
broadly agreed upon; and (2) the product/ratio of the remaining four components, which com-
prises a hodgepodge of guesses, hard-to-pin-down conventions and shifting beliefs. 
 
3. 𝐾 = 𝐺𝑉𝐴 ×
 𝑚 × 𝐻
𝑛𝑟𝑟 × 𝛿
 
 
This decomposition leads us to the gist of the mismatch thesis. If the future were known, 
the four-element product/ratio on the right-hand side of Equation 3 would probably sum up to 
a constant: 𝑚 is pretty much a fixed number (by definition), 𝑛𝑟𝑟 would be a fixed number equal 
to the trend growth of 𝐺𝑉𝐴 and, since there is no uncertainty, both hype 𝐻 and the risk coeffi-
cient 𝛿 would be 1.  
As we noted, though, the future is not only unknown, but unknowable; and when capital-
ists and analysts deal with the unknowable, the regrettable result, or so we are told, is uncer-
tainty, irrationality and distortions. All in all, then, the second component on the right-hand 
side of Equation 3 is sure to oscillate. But this oscillation, the theory’s advocates assure us, is 
part and parcel of the mismatch thesis: while uncertainty, irrationality and distortions abound, 
they are not unbounded. Although the movement of the second element on the right-hand side 
of Equation 3 may have a large amplitude and a long duration, it is ultimately self-correcting – 
or, in the more formal language of statistics, mean-reverting – and this mean-reversion is the 
theoretical basis of all long-term valuation models.  
 
4. Hussman’s Mismatch Model 
 
So let us now see how these principles pan out in practice. Our focus in this section is on the 
model of fund manager John Hussman, which, as far as we know, offers the best prediction of 
long-term future returns.11  
 
Hussman’s Mismatch Indicator (HMI) 
 
The model is based on Hussman’s mismatch index 𝐻𝑀𝐼 (our notation), given by Equation 4: 
 
4. 𝐻𝑀𝐼 =
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
     
 
The two components of 𝐻𝑀𝐼 are plotted in Figure 3. The solid thick series is market capi-
talization (the numerator of Equation 4), while the dashed series is gross value added (the de-
nominator). Both series pertain to U.S.-based nonfinancial corporations, both are denominated 
in dollars, and each is plotted against a log scale.12  
 
  
                                                 
11 Hussman’s own model uses monthly data, whereas our reproduction here employs annual data. The 
model’s rationale, underlying assumptions and technical specifications are provided in Hussman (2015a, 
2015b). Hussman’s articles are archived here: http://www.hussmanfunds.com/weeklyMarketCom-
ment.html.  
12 Hussman’s decision to focus on non-financial corporations rather than all corporations is not theoreti-
cal, but practical: the former cluster offers slightly better predictions than the latter. 
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Figure 3 
U.S.-Based Nonfinancial Corporations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Market value of nonfinancial corporations includes assets held domestically and in the rest of the world. Gross 
value added of nonfinancial corporations is domestic gross value added augmented by the imputed gross value added 
of foreign operations. It is computed by multiplying domestic gross value added of the nonfinancial corporate sector 
by (1 + U.S. profit from foreign operations/U.S. domestic after-tax profit), with both profit components smoothed as 
5-year trailing averages. The last data points are for 2015. 
  
SOURCE: Market value of nonfinancial corporations is from the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds through GI 
(series codes: LM103164103 for domestic assets and LM263164103 for assets held in the rest of the world). Domestic 
gross value added of nonfinancial corporations is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) through GI (series 
code: GVANFC). U.S. after-tax profit is from the BEA through GI (series codes: ZAD for domestic after-tax profit, 
XFYADIV for foreign dividend income and XFYAREONUSDI for reinvested foreign earnings). 
  
 
Figure 4 shows Hussman’s mismatch index ܪܯܫ against the left log scale. Equation 5 
shows that this indicator is equal to the four-element component from the right-hand side of 
Equation 3. And as the chart suggests, the index is indeed mean-reverting: it fluctuates roughly 
between a low of 0.6 and a high of 2.3.  
 
5. ܪܯܫ ൌ ௄ீ௏஺ ൌ
௠ൈு
௡௥௥ൈఋ 
 
Predicting Forward Returns 
 
Now, why should this mismatch ratio be of any interest to investors? The reason is given by 
the dashed series, plotted against the inverted right scale. This series measures the forward an-
nual nominal total rate of return on equities twelve years into the future. In other words, every 
observation in the series tells us what investors who had bought the S&P 500 index in that 
particular year ended up earning in capital gains and dividends, on average, over the next 
twelve years.  
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Figure 4 
Hussman’s U.S. Valuation Index and Forward Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Market value of nonfinancial corporations includes assets held domestically and in the rest of the world. Gross 
value added of nonfinancial corporations is domestic gross value added augmented by the imputed gross value added 
of foreign operations. It is computed by multiplying domestic gross value added of the nonfinancial corporate sector 
by (1 + U.S. profit from foreign operations/U.S. domestic after-tax profit), with both profit components smoothed as 
5-year trailing averages. Forward annual nominal total return on the S&P 500 is calculated by (1) computing the ratio 
between the total return index 12 years ahead and its current value, and (2) taking the twelfth root of that ratio, 
subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100. The semilog correlation is between the log of the valuation index and the forward 
return. The last data points are 2015 for the ratio of market value to gross value added and 2004 for forward annual 
nominal total returns. 
 
SOURCE: Nominal total return for the S&P 500 is from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1969 (series code: 
_SPXTRD) spliced with data from Global Insight (GI) for 1970 onward (series code: SP500TRI). Market value of 
nonfinancial corporations is from the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds through GI (series codes: LM103164103 
for domestic assets and LM263164103 for assets held in the rest of the world). Domestic gross value added of 
nonfinancial corporations is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) through GI (series code: GVANFC). U.S. 
after-tax profit is from the BEA through GI (series codes: ZAD for domestic after-tax profit, XFYADIV for foreign 
dividend income and XFYAREONUSDI for reinvested foreign earnings). 
 
 
For example, an investor who bought the S&P 500 index in 1984, when ܪܯܫ was less than 
0.6, ended up earning an annual average of 16 per cent over the next twelve years. And how 
do we know? We simply project the observation horizontally to the inverted right-hand scale 
and read the result. Or take an investor who bought the market at its 1999 peak, when ܪܸܫ was 
nearly 2.3. Projecting the dashed series onto the right-hand scale shows that this investor ended 
up making an average nominal total return of less than 1 per cent over the next twelve years.  
The key thing to note here is that forward total returns and the Hussman mismatch index 
are nearly perfectly inversely correlated: their Pearson correlation coefficient is –0.93 out of a max-
imum of –1. On the face of it, this result is nothing short of remarkable: while equity owners 
might find it difficult to predict what will happen to their investments in the next few months 
or the next couple of years, according to Hussman’s mismatch model in Figure 4 they can know 
pretty well what they will earn over the next twelve years. (At a risk of putting the cart before 
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the horse, note that the current reading of Hussman’s mismatch index is more or less the same 
as it was in 1999, just before the onset of the latest MBM. What this reading implies can be 
summarized in three ominous words: ‘Winter in Coming’.) 
 
Irrationality, Risk and Return 
 
But the model’s nearly perfect predictive record is somewhat spoiled by two troubling observa-
tions. The first observation concerns ‘economic rationality’. Mainstream economists insists 
that accumulation thrives on and fosters rationality (by which they mean that money prices 
reflect utility, and that this reflection implies Pareto-optimal-resource-allocation-read-utility-
maximization). But Figure 4 seems to suggest the exact opposite: the more irrational the inves-
tors, the greater the apparent mismatch between nominal market capitalization and the real 
fundamentals; and the larger the mismatch, the greater the scope for accumulation – either by 
buying the market long when it is ‘oversold’, or shorting it when it is ‘overbought’ (relative to 
the fundamentals). In other words, utility-maximizing investors have an interest in – and there-
fore an incentive to foster – ‘economic irrationality’. 
The second observation has to do with risk and return. Finance textbooks reiterate the 
Austrian economic mantra that the two go hand in hand: since there can be no gain without 
pain, or so they say, those who wish to earn more must be willing to take on a greater risk. But 
here too Figure 4 seems to imply otherwise: according to the historical data, the greatest future 
returns are available when risk is lowest (such as in the early 1980s), whereas when risk is very 
high (for instance, during the late 1990s), eventual returns are dismal. In other words, investors 
are either free riders who get something for nothing, or suckers who pay something for noth-
ing. . . .13    
 
5. The Power Model 
 
Having outlined the conventional cosmology of finance, let us now turn it upside down by 
sketching our own, triangular CasP model of the stock market. We do so in three steps: in this 
section we examine the stock market from the viewpoint of capitalized power; in the next sec-
tion we relate this capitalized power to systemic risk; and in the subsequent section we tie both 
capitalized power and systemic risk with strategic sabotage. 
 
The Power Index (PI) 
 
Figure 5 introduces our power index and contrasts it with Hussman’s. The dashed series is 
Hussman’s mismatch index 𝐻𝑀𝐼 plotted against the right log scale. The solid series, plotted 
against the left log scale, is our own power index 𝑃𝐼, defined as the ratio between the S&P 500 
price index and the average wage rate, normalized with its historical mean=100:  
 
6. 𝑃𝐼 =
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
 
                                                 
13 Hussman’s position on this issue is not entirely clear. On the one hand, he repeatedly alerts his readers 
that extremely overvalued stocks represent a toxic combination of maximum risk and minimum return 
(see, for instance, 2000, 2016). On the other hand, as far as we can tell, he keeps silent on why this theo-
retically awkward risk/return profile should exist in the first place. 
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Figure 5 
U.S. Equity Valuations: Mismatch or Power? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Market value of nonfinancial corporations includes assets held domestically and in the rest of the world. Gross 
value added of nonfinancial corporations is domestic gross value added augmented by the imputed gross value added 
of foreign operations. It is computed by multiplying domestic gross value added of the nonfinancial corporate sector 
by (1 + U.S. profit from foreign operations/U.S. domestic after-tax profit), with both profit components smoothed as 
5-year trailing averages. The S&P 500 price splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and 
railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite 
(1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The wage rate splices the hourly 
wage rate for manufacturing production workers till 1946 with the hourly wage rate for nonfarm business-sector 
workers from 1947 onward. The last data points are 2015 for the mismatch index and 2016 for the power index. 
   
SOURCE: Market value of nonfinancial corporations is from the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds through GI 
(series codes: LM103164103 for domestic assets and LM263164103 for assets held in the rest of the world). Domestic 
gross value added of nonfinancial corporations is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) through GI (series 
code: GVANFC). U.S. after-tax profit is from the BEA through GI (series codes: ZAD for domestic after-tax profit, 
XFYADIV for foreign dividend income and XFYAREONUSDI for reinvested foreign earnings). The S&P 500 price 
is from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1900 (series code: _SPXD) and from Global Insight (GI) from 1901 onward 
(series code: JS&PNS). The hourly wage rate splices the following series: Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Millennial Edition Online: hourly wages in manufacturing, all trades, 1865-1889 (series code: Ba4290), hourly earnings 
in manufacturing, all industries, 1890-1913 (series code: Ba4299), weekly earnings of production workers in 
manufacturing, 1914-1918 (series code: Ba4362), hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing, 1919-1938 
(series code: Ba4361); Global Insight (GI): average hourly earnings of production workers in manufacturing, 1939-
1946 (series code: AHPMFNS); Conference Board through GI: average hourly compensation of all employees in the 
nonfarm business sector (series code: JRWSSNFE). 
 
Why is the ratio of the S&P 500 price index to the wage rate a ‘power index’? To answer 
this question, recall that Hussman’s mismatch index ܪܯܫ tries to match market capitalization 
(which represents the aggregate purchasing power of equity holders) with the underlying fun-
damentals of this capitalization (a proxy for the aggregate income services to be produced by 
the corresponding real capital stock).  
Our own power index ܲܫ is very different. First, it shifts the discussion from ontological to 
operational symbolism.14 Note that, unlike Hussman, we compare not overall purchasing power 
                                                 
14 The notion of ‘capital as power’ as an operational symbol was first suggested and elaborated by Ulf 
Martin (2010). Following Sybille Krämer, Martin distinguishes between three types of symbols: magical 
BICHLER & NITZAN • A CasP Model of the Stock Market 
 
– 15 – 
 
and income services, but merely prices. For Hussman, nominal market capitalization is an on-
tological symbol: it represents, accurately or inaccurately, an external entity out there – in this 
case, the ‘real’ utils to be generated by the ‘real’ capital stock. In contrast, we see stock prices 
and the wage rate as generative, or operational symbols. Their ratio does not represent an outside 
reality, it constitutes that reality – in this case, the capitalized power of owners imposed on the 
underlying population.   
The second difference is that the constituents of the power index 𝑃𝐼 – stock prices and the 
wage rate – are totally different creatures. Unlike the numerator and denominator of Huss-
man’s mismatch model, they have no reason to match and therefore no reason to mismatch.  
 This is no coincidence. Whereas the liberal universe tries to harmonize its categories, the 
CasP cosmos pits them against each other. And indeed, instead of mirroring one another, the 
numerator and denominator of 𝑃𝐼 represent a conflict: the clash between those who own the 
capitalized means of power and those who are controlled by them. Note that we use the average 
wage rate here not as a measure of productivity or wellbeing, but as a benchmark against which 
to gauge the differential power of owners. Furthermore, although strictly speaking the wage 
rate pertains only to employed workers, its temporal movement approximates, however 
crudely, the changing conditions of the underlying population at large. Thus, when our power 
index 𝑃𝐼 rises, this means not that the market is distorted or that investors are economically 
irrational, but that the power of equity owners relative to the underlying population increases 
– and vice versa when the index falls. Moreover, and importantly, this relative power is forward 
looking: it denotes not only the rulers’ relative position here and now, but also how they expect 
this relative position to change in the future.  
All in all, then, the mismatch and power indices are conceptually distinct and theoretically 
unrelated. And yet – and here we come to the important bit – despite these fundamental differ-
ences they correlate almost perfectly: according to Figure 5, their Pearson coefficient, extended 
over more than half a century, is +0.96 out of a maximum of +1. 
 
Mismatch or Power? 
 
What explains this remarkably tight correlation? Is this a miraculous statistical fluke, or is there 
a hidden connection between these seemingly different indicators? The answer emerges from 
Equations 7-11, which relate Hussman’s mismatch index 𝐻𝑀𝐼 to our own power index 𝑃𝐼.   
 
𝐺𝑉𝐴 gross value added ($) 
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐷 gross value added deflator ($) 
𝐾 market capitalization ($) 
𝑁 number of shares outstanding (decimal) 
𝑃 stock market price index ($) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑊/𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐷 (decimal) 
𝑄 ‘real’ gross value added (decimal) 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑁/𝑄 (decimal) 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑁/𝑄 × 𝑊/𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐷 (decimal) 
𝑊 wage rate ($) 
                                                 
(the entity is the symbol), ontological (the symbol represents a distinct worldly entity), and operational 
(the symbol defines the entity). According to Martin, capital as power, because it defines its own logic as 
well as creates and recreates the social reality, is best understood as an operational symbol.  
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Equation 7 decomposes both market capitalization 𝐾 and gross value added 𝐺𝑉𝐴 to their 
respective price and quantity components (the average price of stocks 𝑃 and the number of out-
standing stocks 𝑁 for the former, the gross value added deflator 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐷 and real gross value added 
𝑄 for the latter).  
 
7. 𝐻𝑀𝐼 =
𝐾
𝐺𝑉𝐴
=
𝑃 × 𝑁
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐷 × 𝑄
    
 
Equation 8 divides and multiplies the denominator of Hussman’s mismatch index by the wage 
rate 𝑊 and rearranges the terms: 
 
8. 𝐻𝑀𝐼 =
𝑃 ×𝑁
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐷
𝑊
 ×𝑊 × 𝑄
=  
𝑃
𝑊
×
𝑁
𝑄
×
𝑊
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐷
 
 
Equations 9-11 show further rearrangements, to accentuate the connection between the mis-
match and power indices: 
 
9. 𝐻𝑀𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼 ×
𝑁
𝑄
×
𝑊
𝐺𝑉𝐴𝐷
   
 
10. 𝐻𝑀𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼 × 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 × 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
 
11. 𝐻𝑀𝐼 = 𝑃𝐼 × 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 
 
Equation 11 shows that the power index 𝑃𝐼 – i.e. the capitalized conflict between equity 
owners and the underlying population – is in fact part and parcel of Hussman’s mismatch index 
𝐻𝑀𝐼, while the nearly perfect correlation in Figure 5 suggests the former index is the main 
driver of the latter. The combined impact on 𝐻𝑀𝐼 of the quantity and price ratios is a negligible 
residual.15 
In this sense, the mismatch theory reminds us of the Ptolemaic geocentric view. The idea 
that the sun epicycles around the earth yielded fairly accurate predictions, but it was nonethe-
less wrong.16 And perhaps the same might be said about the notion that capitalists and analysts 
price the stock market to match the so-called real fundamentals of utility and productivity: just 
like the geocentric view, this notion yields very tight predictions, and just like the geocentric 
view, it seems completely misplaced. The real driving force here is not the mismatching of 
future utility, but changes in organized power. 
 
Capitalized Power and Forward Returns 
 
Moreover, according to Figure 6, it appears that it is this actual reality of capitalized power – 
and not the mismatched reality of utility and productivity – that drives future returns. The chart 
displays two series. The solid series is our power index, plotted on the left log scale. The dashed 
                                                 
15 Historically, the 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 has trended downward while the 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 has trended upward. 
Moreover, the two movements have more or less offset each other, so their product – the 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 in 
Equation 11 – has ended up moving sideways, showing little or no correlation with the mismatch and 
power indices. 
16 For a succinct comparison between the old geocentric model and its heliocentric alternative, see Singh 
(2004, particularly Table 2, pp. 34-35). 
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series, plotted on the right inverted scale, is the forward annual nominal total returns on the 
S&P 500, projected twelve years ahead. For convenience, the chart shows the historical mean 
of the power index (=100), one standard deviation below and two standard deviations above it 
and the last four MBMs (shaded). 
The bottom left of the chart lists Pearson correlation coefficients for different periods. In 
general, the correlation between capitalized power and future returns is weaker before 1929 
than after. The relevant period for comparison, though, is 1953-2004 – the years covered by 
Hussman’s model in Figure 4. For this period, the correlation in Figure 6 is –0.85, only a bit 
lower than Hussman’s –0.93 (which is to be expected, given the additional contribution of the 
ܴ݁ݏ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ factor). 
 
Figure 6 
The Power Index and Forward Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Shaded years denote major bear markets (MBMs) as defined in Table 1. Series are normalized with their 
historical mean=100. The S&P 500 price splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and 
railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite 
(1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The wage rate splices hourly data 
for manufacturing production workers till 1946 with hourly data for nonfarm business-sector workers from 1947 
onward. Forward annual nominal total return on the S&P 500 is calculated by (1) computing the ratio between the 
total return index 12 years ahead and its current value, and (2) taking the twelfth root of that ratio, subtracting 1 and 
multiplying by 100. The semilog correlation is between the log of the power index and the forward return. The last 
data points are 2015 for the ratio of market capitalization to gross value added and 2004 for forward annual nominal 
total returns 
 
SOURCE: The S&P 500 price is from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1900 (series code: _SPXD) and from Global 
Insight (GI) from 1901 onward (series code: JS&PNS). The hourly wage rate splices the following series: Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online: hourly wages in manufacturing, all trades, 1865-1889 (series 
code: Ba4290), hourly earnings in manufacturing, all industries, 1890-1913 (series code: Ba4299), weekly earnings of 
production workers in manufacturing, 1914-1918 (series code: Ba4362), hourly earnings of production workers in 
manufacturing, 1919-1938 (series code: Ba4361); Global Insight (GI): average hourly earnings of production workers 
in manufacturing, 1939-1946, (series code: AHPMFNS); Conference Board through GI: average hourly compensation 
of all employees in the nonfarm business sector (series code: JRWSSNFE). Nominal total return for the S&P 500 is 
from GFD till 1969 (series code: _SPXTRD) spliced with data from Global Insight (GI) for 1970 onward (series code: 
SP500TRI). 
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Irrationality, Risk and Return (Reconsidered) 
 
So the difference between the mismatch and power indices is not empirical but theoretical, and 
here we should return to the two points raised at the end of the previous section: the issue of 
irrationality and the relationship between risk and return.  
Begin with irrationality. If capitalists and analysts were perfectly rational and fully presci-
ent, the four-component element on the right-had side of Equation 3 would be a fixed number, 
market capitalization would fluctuate in tandem with gross value added and Hussman’s mis-
match index would trace a straight horizontal line equal to the index’s historical mean. This is 
what a perfectly matched world should look like.  
But that is not what we see in practice. Looking at the power index in Figure 6 – which, as 
we have seen in Figure 5, is nearly a carbon copy of Hussman’s mismatch index – we see that 
fewer than 15 per cent of the observations are equal to the index’s normalized mean of 100. 
The rest are either bigger or smaller. In other words, from the viewpoint of the mismatch thesis, 
the market is, by and large, economically irrational. Moreover – and here we come to the key 
point – the irrationality is almost always blamed on different forms of power, from asymmetric 
information and policy mistakes to market imperfections and extra-economic interventions. 
But then, if valuation is almost always out of tune and its deviations are mostly a matter of 
power, why not put aside irrationality and distortions and focus directly on what everyone 
seems to agree matters the most – namely power? Once the focus shifts to power, there is noth-
ing to match and therefore no mismatch. And with the mismatch gone, there is no longer any-
thing irrational about the valuation index going up and down. Its movements simply reflect the 
changing landscape of power.  
The second difference has to do with risk and return. As noted, the annals of finance stip-
ulate that risk and return should be positively correlated – yet, according to both the mismatch 
and power models, their correlation is in fact negative. Now, while this negative correlation 
does not sit well with the economic underpinnings of the mismatch thesis, it is perfectly con-
sistent with the power underpinnings of our CasP model. Just like the mismatch index, capi-
talized power predicts forward returns negatively: the higher the power, the lower the return. 
And the reason for this negative relation is twofold: (1) power is always exercised through some 
form of strategic sabotage (a concept to which we return below), and sabotage elicits resistance; 
and (2) the greater the power and sabotage, the greater the provoked resistance. Everything else 
being the same, it is easier for capitalists to augment their power when the power index is at 
one or two standard deviations below its average (like it was in the 1940s and 1980s, for exam-
ple) than when the index is one or two standard deviations above it (like in the 1900s, the 1990s 
and now). It is this changing intensity of resistance – and the fact that resistance goes hand in 
hand with power – that makes our power index mean reverting, and it is this mean reversion 
that ascertains that risk and return will be related negatively rather than positively. 
In this respect, it seems that two standard deviations above the mean is the historical as-
ymptote, or limit, of capitalized equity power in the United States.17 This asymptote was 
reached three times over the past 150 years – in the early 1900s, in the late 1990s, and now – 
and in the previous two times this has happened, there followed a significant reversal in the 
                                                 
17 For different analyses of the asymptotes of power, see Bichler and Nitzan (2012a), Kliman, Bichler and 
Nitzan (2011) and Bichler and Nitzan (2014). 
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form of an MBM. In other words, when capitalized power approaches its asymptotes, capital-
ists have good reason to fear their very own power. And here we come to the second aspect of 
our model: the phenomenon of systemic fear.  
 
6. Systemic Fear 
 
Seven years ago, in the midst of the financial crisis, we wrote a paper in which we argued that 
capitalists were struck by systemic fear: that they were apprehensive not about rising interest 
rates or falling profit, but about the very existence of the system as they knew it.18 We also argued 
that their systemic fear could be identified empirically, by looking at the co-movement of stock 
prices and corporate profit (Nitzan and Bichler 2009b; expanded in Bichler and Nitzan 2010). 
 
Identifying Systemic Fear 
 
Our logic could be summarized as follows. Capitalization is forward-looking: according to val-
uation guru Benjamin Graham, it should discount not current profit, but the profits that will be 
earned in the future, all the way to ‘eternity’ (quoted in Zweig 2009: 28). In this scheme, current 
variations in profit have no more than a negligible impact on the final outcome. And indeed, if 
you revisit Equation 3, you will see that capitalization in this equation depends on the coeffi-
cient 𝑚, which in turn hinges on the average future share of profit in 𝐺𝑉𝐴 and the average 
future growth rate of 𝐺𝑉𝐴. Current profit does not even appear there. 
This ritualistic reliance on the future implies systemic confidence. It demonstrates a belief 
that earnings will continue to flow and that assets will always have buyers – in other words, 
that the system is eternal, and that the operational symbol of capitalization will dominate the 
world forever.  
Now, imagine the very opposite situation – a setting in which capitalists lose this systemic 
confidence in the future and are instead struck by systemic fear. What happens when they start 
to hesitate? What happens when the power index is at an all-time high and capitalists become 
concerned that the current power architecture is unsustainable? When the chief promoters of 
globalization throw in the towel, saying that globalization doesn’t work? When some periph-
eral states drift out of their superpower orbit while others disintegrate altogether? When con-
ventional economic predictions fail miserably and domestic policymakers seem clueless? When 
inequality reaches historical extremes and the underlying population simmers with discontent? 
When the ecosystem destabilizes and resource extraction faces exhaustion? The result of these 
developments is systemic fear, an apprehension that the current mode of power might crumble. 
The rulers’ immediate reaction to systemic fear, though, is not capitulation, but denial: 
‘What? We, capitalists, worry? Fear for our system? No way!’ But, then, to sustain this denial 
and retain a semblance of confidence, capitalists need evidence that they are still very much in 
driver’s seat, and the most readily available evidence of such control is current profit. If current 
profit remains high – or better still, if it continues to rise – then we, the capitalists, can remain 
hopeful despite the threatening future. And if our group as a whole stays hopeful, then, as 
                                                 
18 ‘For this consciousness [of the capitalist bound to the steering wheel of a megamachine gone wild] was 
not in peril and fear for this element or that [such as falling profit or rising volatility], nor for this or that 
moment of time [like a sharp market correction or a declaration of war], it was afraid for its entire being; 
it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master [the ultimate wrath of the ruled]. It has been in that experience 
melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has 
quaked within it [will capitalism survive?]’ (Hegel 1807: 237; paraphrased in Bichler and Nitzan 2010: 
19). 
BICHLER & NITZAN • A CasP Model of the Stock Market 
 
– 20 – 
 
individual investors, we all have good reason to hold on to and even augment our equity port-
folios. 
Paradoxically, then, the evidence for systemic fear lies in its very denial. We can know that 
capitalists have been struck by systemic fear by the fact that they effectively negate and abandon 
their core ritual of forward-looking capitalization; and we can know the degree to which they 
negate this ritual by the extent to which their asset pricing comes to depend on current rather 
than future earnings. 
In our earlier work we used this empirical proof-by-negation to argue that there were two 
periods during which capitalists were struck by systemic fear: the 1930s and the 2000s (Nitzan 
and Bichler 2009b; Bichler and Nitzan 2010). We demonstrated our argument in three steps: 
first by plotting the annual rates of change of equity prices and current earnings per share (EPS) 
smoothed as three-year trailing averages; then by visually comparing the co-movements of 
these rates of change; and finally by identifying the 1930s and the 2000s as the only two periods 
in which the two rate-of-change series seemed tightly correlated.19 Unfortunately, though, our 
method was not very rigorous, and that lack of rigor caused us to make a serious empirical 
mistake: we failed to identify two additional periods in which the series were positively corre-
lated, and this failure incited a heated debate in the Journal of Critical Globalization Studies 
(Kliman, Bichler, and Nitzan 2011). 
 
The Systemic Fear Index 
 
So here we try to do things differently. First, we look not at the rates of change of stock prices 
and EPS, as we originally did, but at their levels. Measures of correlation already reflect change, 
so to correlate rates of change is akin to looking at the second instead of the first derivative. 
Second, we shorten the window of comparison between price and current EPS. Our original 
three-year window was probably far too long for short-sighted capitalists, so here we reduce it 
to twelve months. Third and finally, instead of merely eyeballing the correlation window be-
tween the rates of change of stock prices and EPS, we measure it systematically as it drifts over 
the entire dataset.20  
The result of these modifications is displayed in Figure 7. The top panel of the chart shows 
normalized monthly price and EPS data for the S&P 500 group of companies, dating back to 
1871. The bottom panel plots short-term correlations. The thin series in the bottom panel 
measures the 12-month trailing correlation between the price and EPS series shown in the top 
panel. Each observation shows the correlation over the past year, with a value ranging between 
–1 (perfect inverse correlation) and +1 (perfect direct co-movement).  
The difficulty with the thin 12-month trailing correlation is that it oscillates widely, so vis-
ual inspection alone is not very revealing here. The thick series in the bottom panel addresses 
this difficulty by smoothing the thin series as a 10-year trailing average. Each observation in 
the thick series measures the average 12-month trailing correlation between price and EPS over 
the previous ten years. We call this series the systemic fear index.21   
                                                 
19 Strictly speaking, the term ‘current’ earnings per share is a misnomer: in practice, EPS data are reported 
as the average earnings per share recorded over the previous twelve months. In this sense, all current earn-
ing data are in fact backward-looking.   
20 The use of a moving correlation here was suggested and empirically demonstrated by Ulf Martin (pri-
vate communication with the authors, May 2014). 
21 For example, the systemic fear index for September 2015 (the last observation in the series) is +0.538. 
This result is derived by averaging out the 120 monthly readings of the 12-month trailing correlations 
between August 2005 and September 2015.  
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Figure 7 
The S&P 500 Price and EPS: The Systemic Fear Index  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The S&P 500 index splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock 
series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 
90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The 12-month trailing correlation in the bottom 
panel (thin series) measures the correlation between price and earnings per share (EPS). The 10-year trailing average 
(thick series) is the mean of this trailing correlation over the past 120 months. The last data points are September 2015 
for EPS and April 2016 for price. 
 
SOURCE: S&P 500 price and EPS are from Robert J. Shiller’s online data archives 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, accessed on April 20, 2016). 
 
 
The Historical Evolution of Systemic Fear 
 
Figure 8 enlarges our systemic fear index taken from the bottom panel of Figure 7, making it 
easier to examine. The chart shows two clear patterns: one long term, the other shorter term. 
The long-term pattern has a V-shape, with the early 1990s as its low point. Until the early 1920s, 
forward-looking capitalization was still in its infancy, so the correlation between price and EPS 
was pretty high, hovering around +0.4. But even then there was already a visible down drift, 
and by the early 1940s this down drift had turned into a sharp decline. Discounting methods 
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were now making their way into introductory textbooks, and by the 1950s, with the capitaliza-
tion ritual becoming more widely accepted and increasingly internalized by equity investors, 
the correlation fell to around zero and from then onwards continued to hover around this value 
– albeit with some significant oscillations. The decisive reversal came only in the early 1990s. 
Initially, the uptick looked like part of yet another short oscillation. But by the early 2000s it 
became evident (at least in retrospect) that the century-long downtrend had been broken. In-
stead of reverting back to zero, the systemic fear index continued to soar and, by the early 
2010s, reached an all-time high of +0.6. 
This V-shape pattern, though, has been anything but smooth. Oscillating around the long-
term down- and uptrends we can see plenty of shorter-term fluctuations, some of which are 
pretty pronounced. So the question we need to address is what lies behind these patterns: what 
determines the long-term V-shape of the index and what accounts for its shorter-term fluctua-
tions?  
 
Figure 8 
The Systemic Fear Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The systemic fear index is calculated in two steps: (1) computing the 12-month trailing correlation between 
price and earnings per share (EPS) of the S&P 500 index; (2) calculating the 10-year trailing average of the 12-month 
moving correlation computed in the first step. The S&P 500 index splices the following four sub-series: a combination 
of bank, insurance and railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and 
Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The last data 
point is for September 2015. 
 
SOURCE: S&P 500 price and EPS are from Robert J. Shiller’s online data archives 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, accessed on April 20, 2016). 
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Culture or Power? 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this question has never been asked, let alone answered. Indeed, 
as far as we know, the V-shape pattern of the short-term price-EPS correlation shown in Figures 
7 and 8 is a new finding.   
It is common to argue that, since the 1980s, U.S. capitalism has been marked by a growing 
emphasis on ‘shareholder value’, heightened ‘short-termism’ and a nearly universal obsession 
with quarterly increases in profit. This popular view is certainly consistent with the post-1980s 
surge of the price-EPS correlation shown in Figure 8 – and this consistency should hardly sur-
prise us. With capitalists paying more and more attention to the latest bottom line and analysts 
glued to the latest bit of news, it is no wonder that equity markets have become increasingly 
sensitive to the most recent variations in earnings.  
But what is the cause of these changes? Why has the capitalist time horizon shrunk? Why 
have investors who, for a whole century up until that point, cared less and less about current 
earnings and often seemed perfectly happy to buy and hold stocks for the long haul, suddenly 
started to insist on quarterly increases in profit? Is the V-shape reversal of the early 1990s merely 
the consequence of a changing ‘investment culture’? Is it simply a new fad imprinted by the 
theoretical winds of just-in-time neoliberalism and emboldened by the ideological flare of Mar-
garet Thatcher, Ronald Reagan and Alan Greenspan – or are these developments themselves 
the result of a deeper change?  
The evidence presented below suggests the latter. Present-day capitalists and analysts, we 
argue, have come to demand quarterly increases in profits not because they started to ‘feel like 
it’, because they were taken over by a new financial ‘fashion’ or because they were somehow 
convinced that short-term increases are more ‘economically efficient’ than long-term growth. 
In our view, they do so because they are compelled to, and the force that compels them has 
nothing to do with any of the above: their capitalized power is approaching its asymptotes, and 
the only way for them to counteract their deepening systemic fear is by pushing for higher 
current earnings. 
 
The Co-Movement of Capitalized Power and Systemic Fear 
 
The long-term relationship between systemic fear and capitalized power is shown in Figure 9. 
The chart displays two series. The dotted blue series, plotted against the right scale, is our sys-
temic fear index, taken from Figure 8. To reiterate, this index is the 10-year trailing average of 
the 12-month trailing correlation between the S&P 500 price and EPS. The solid black series, 
plotted against the left log scale, is our power index, which we take from Figure 6 and smooth 
as a 10-year trailing average to match the periodicity of the systemic fear index.  
The correlation between the two series is extremely tight: its Pearson coefficient for the 
past 132 years is +0.83 out of a maximum of +1. What this correlation tells us is that the greater 
the capitalized power of equity owners relative to the underlying population, the greater their 
systemic fear and therefore the greater their reliance on current earnings when pricing their 
stocks – and conversely, the lesser their capitalized power, the lower their systemic fear and 
hence the weaker their emphasis on present profit.  
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Figure 9 
The Dialectic of Power and Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The systemic fear index represents annual averages of the monthly series shown in Figure 7. The S&P 500 
price splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock series weighed by Global 
Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-
1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The wage rate splices hourly data for manufacturing production workers till 
1946 with hourly data for nonfarm business-sector workers from 1947 onward. The last data points are 2014 for the 
systemic fear index and 2016 for the power index. 
 
SOURCE: Annual S&P 500 price is from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1900 (series code: _SPXD) and from 
Global Insight (GI) from 1901 onward (series code: JS&PNS). The hourly wage rate splices the following series: 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online: hourly wages in manufacturing, all trades, 1865-1889 
(series code: Ba4290), hourly earnings in manufacturing, all industries, 1890-1913 (series code: Ba4299), weekly 
earnings of production workers in manufacturing, 1914-1918 (series code: Ba4362), hourly earnings of production 
workers in manufacturing, 1919-1938 (series code: Ba4361); Global Insight (GI): average hourly earnings of production 
workers in manufacturing, 1939-1946 (series code: AHPMFNS); Conference Board through GI: average hourly 
compensation of all employees in the nonfarm business sector (series code: JRWSSNFE). Monthly S&P 500 price and 
EPS are from Robert J. Shiller’s online data archives  
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, accessed on April 20, 2016). 
 
 
The Dialectic of Power and Fear 
 
At first sight, this co-movement might seem counterintuitive. Why should capitalists fear more 
for their system as they grow more powerful? Shouldn’t it be the other way around – i.e., the 
greater their power, the lesser their systemic fear? 
To answer this question, we need to backtrack a bit. Power is a complex and often slippery 
concept. It has numerous dimensions and layers, it is historically contingent and context-de-
pendent and, most importantly, it is deeply dialectical and self-transformative. In our own re-
search, we extend Johannes Kepler’s scientific notion of force to view capitalized power not as 
a stand-alone qualitative entity, but as a quantitative relationship between entities (Nitzan and 
Bichler 2014: 141). In the present paper, we define this power very broadly as the relationship 
between equity owners and the underlying population, quantified by the ratio of stock prices to 
the wage rate. But we also argue that the quantity of capitalized power expresses the rulers’ 
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confidence in the obedience of the ruled (Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: 17) – which in our case here 
denotes the confidence of equity owners in the obedience of the underlying population. 
Confidence in obedience, though, is not a monolithic sentiment. If we are to generalize, 
we might say that the buildup of power generates not one, but two movements – one extro-
verted, the other introverted – and that the trajectories of these two movements are not similar 
but opposite. On the outside, the relationship appears positive: the greater the rulers’ power, the 
greater their display of confidence in obedience. But on the inside, the connection is negative: 
the more powerful the rulers, the greater their fear that their power might crumble.  
This double-sided relationship is the linchpin of Hobbes’ Leviathan (1691). The relatively 
equal abilities of human beings, he says, breed their uncertainty, insecurity and mutual suspi-
cion, and these forces in turn compel them to try to increase their differential power without 
end. But, then – and this is the crucial qualifier – the more power one possesses, the more he 
or she dreads losing it all. The result is an ongoing cycle, with fear stoking a hunger for power, 
and the amassment of power heightening the very fear that begot that hunger in the first place 
(for example, pp. 75 and 94).  
Now consider how this double movement unfolds in our case here. Capitalists, we posit, 
are driven to increase their capitalized power without end, and this increase, we maintain, 
boosts their expressed confidence in obedience. And how do we know that their confidence in 
obedience is indeed rising? Because the stock prices comprising the numerator of the power 
index are determined by the capitalists themselves, and because capitalists determine those prices 
by risking the thing they cherish the most: their own money. Indeed, the only reason for capital-
ists to buy stocks and in so doing bid up the stock price/wage ratio is that they expect this ratio 
to rise even further. And the fact that they believe that this ratio will go up attests to their 
confidence in obedience – the confidence that the underlying population will not expropriate 
them and that the system as a whole will not fail them. In this sense, our power index offers an 
objective measure of capitalist confidence – at least on the outside.  
But as Figure 9 shows, there is another, inner process at work here: the temporal basis for 
capitalist confidence in obedience varies with the level of capitalized power. When the power 
index is low, the projected confidence of capitalists is inherently forward-looking. During such 
periods – for example, the 1940s or the 1980s – capitalists focus on the future and ignore present 
profit altogether (as indicated by the low, zero or even negative price-EPS correlation). And 
why? Because the lower the capitalized power, the greater the scope for increasing it further: income 
can be further redistributed in favour of profit, hype can be further amplified, profit volatility 
can be further decreased and the discount rate can be further lowered. And as long as these 
elements can be further augmented/reduced in favour of capital, owners can safely ignore the 
dismal present and focus on the promising future. 
However, when the power index is high – as it was, for example, during the early twentieth 
century, and as it is now, at the beginning of the twenty-first – confidence in obedience has to 
rely largely on the present (and it does – as indicated by the high price-EPS correlation during 
these periods). And why? Because capitalized power is not unbounded. The greater the power, 
the greater the resistance to power. And when power approaches its asymptotes – in this case, 
when the profit share of income and the level of hype are already high and income volatility 
and the normal rate of return already low – increasing it further within the existing confines of 
the ‘symbolic machine’, as Ulf Martin (2010) calls it, becomes harder and harder.22 Such in-
creases require further threat, sabotage and open force, which in turn make the system ever 
                                                 
22 Bichler and Nitzan (2012a) examine some of these limits in the United States. 
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more complex and increasingly brittle, and hence prone to breakdown (Bichler and Nitzan 
2010). Under these circumstances, the only way for capitalists to retain their apparent confi-
dence is to be constantly reassured that the system still holds here and now. And since the 
future is too bleak to rely on, this reassurance can come only from current profit. 
 
The Omen 
 
Rulers always need an omen, a self-serving looking glass to bolster their confidence and galva-
nize their resolve. But sometimes the omen refuses to cooperate, and when it disobeys, the 
façade crumbles and the rulers find themselves facing the void. Literature offers many illustri-
ous examples: the evil queen in the Brothers Grimm’s Little Snow-White, whose obedient magic 
mirror suddenly defies her, declaring that she is not the fairest of all; Genghis Khan in Aitma-
tov’s The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years (1983), whose loyal guiding cloud suddenly dis-
appears, leaving the Khan’s globetrotting conquest in tatters; Belshazzar, the omnipotent king 
of Babylon, whose hubris is suddenly deflated by a mysterious writing on the wall (Book of 
Daniel: Ch. 5); the list goes on. 
These power mirrors, though, are pretty naïve. They typically generate no more than a 
binary image, and their warnings almost always come too late. By contrast, the stock price-
EPS correlation offers an infinitely nuanced reflection. Instead of a binary image, it draws a 
continuous scale, ranging from a Pearson coefficient of 0 (or less), which indicates that forward-
looking capitalists do not fear for their system, to a Pearson coefficient of +1, which means that 
capitalists, struck by systemic fear, have abandoned their core belief in forward-looking capi-
talization in favour of a defensive, backward-looking posture.  
This analytical range is shown historically in Figure 10. The chart presents the same data 
series from Figure 9, but instead of displaying them on a time scale, it plots them against one 
another. Each annual observation projects two readings: the 10-year trailing average of the 
power index on the horizontal scale, and the systemic fear index on the vertical scale. The 
observations are tightly clustered around a positive slope, reconfirming what we have already 
seen in Figure 9 – namely, that capitalized power is closely intertwined with systemic fear. For 
illustration purposes, we use a dashed red line to trace the evolution of this temporal relation-
ship during the most recent period: from 1983, when the systemic fear index was at a record 
low, to 2014, when it reached its all-time high. 
The gradual temporal ‘stretching’ of this dashed line has been akin to pulling a string: as 
the United States moved up and to the right on this path, the tension between sabotage and 
resistance kept rising and rising. However, because the process has been so slow and drawn 
out, initially this buildup was largely imperceptible. Indeed, until recently the key ‘actors’ them-
selves – i.e., the capitalists and fund managers, along with policymakers and opinion shapers – 
remained largely unware of it and seldom admitted it, not even to themselves (and rarely if ever 
in the manner described here). But as Veblen might have put it, although they are yet to recog-
nize it with their mind, they already know it in their heart. And here their actions speak louder 
than words: with their power rising, they have gradually but systematically abandoned their 
sacred ritual of forward-looking capitalization in favour of the still-rosy present. Their current 
mode of power is becoming increasingly unstable, and their short-term equity pricing indicates 
that underneath the hubris lies a deepening apprehension that it might not last.  
Our own study of redistribution as the key power axis of capitalism started during the early 
1980s. At the time, U.S. capitalized power and systemic fear were at all-time lows, investors 
were totally oblivious to the issue and our work was typically classified as ‘social economics’ 
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pricing can ignore current profits
(with an aftertaste of moralizing ‘social justice’). But as capitalized power and systemic fear 
increased, the crucial importance of redistribution slowly percolated to the surface, and in 2014, 
when power and fear reached record highs, Thomas Piketty’s work on inequality (Piketty 2014) 
was suddenly made top news and everyone suddenly knew (all along) that the top 1 per cent 
held the rest of the world under its thumb.  
 
Figure 10 
The Dialectic of Power and Fear, 1882-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE & SOURCE: See Figure 9. 
 
 
And then the discourse started to change. Although the talking heads still hail capitalism 
as the best of all possible worlds, we now begin to see more and more expressions of guilt (the 
IMF admitting that the project of neoliberal globalization has been 'oversold'; Ostry, Loungani, 
and Furceri 2016), remorse (McKinsey cautioning that the current generation is poorer than its 
parents; McKinsey & Company et al. 2016) and dire warnings (former bond king Bill Gross 
alerting his fellow capitalists that, although ‘I’m an investor that ultimately does believe in the 
system’, I believe that ‘the system itself is at risk’; Gittelsohn 2016). With tension remaining at 
an all-time high, many savvy investors sense that sooner or later the spring will snap, and as 
confidence crumbles and the rulers run for the stock-market doors, a new MBM will get under 
way.   
 
The Temporal Basis of Confidence in Obedience 
 
In sum, we can say that the power and systemic fear indices tell us two opposite things about 
the capitalist outlook: the power index expresses the capitalists’ outer confidence in obedience, 
while the systemic fear index indicates the inner capitalist apprehension that the mode of power 
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might not last. Although they point in different directions, though, the two measures are inti-
mately intertwined: the systemic fear index shows the temporal basis of capitalist confidence. 
When power is low, confidence is based on the future and relies on forward-looking capitali-
zation. But as power rises, the basis of confidence shifts to the present – and this shift, which 
implies a growing reliance on current profit, spells the progressive breakdown of forward-look-
ing capitalization and a deepening fear for the system’s future.  
 
7. Strategic Sabotage 
 
This discussion leads us to the third aspect of our triangular CasP model: the claim that capi-
talized power and systemic fear are both driven by strategic sabotage.23   
 
Is the Stock Market Pro-Cyclical or Countercyclical? 
 
Needless to say, this claim is diametrically opposed to the mismatch thesis. The dominant view 
is that financial markets oscillate around their economic fundamentals and that the oscillation 
is pro-cyclical. The stronger the fundamentals, the greater the optimism and therefore the larger 
the overshooting – and conversely, the weaker the fundamentals, the deeper the pessimism and 
therefore the greater the undershooting. This is why market ‘bubbles’ are supposed to inflate 
when the economy is booming and deflate when it tanks. 
Now, in our own work we have shown that, more often than not, the stock market is not 
pro-cyclical. As Figures 9 and 10 demonstrate, stock prices oscillate together with current profit 
only when the market is very ‘expensive’ (i.e., when capitalized power is extremely high). 
When valuations are average, low or very low – which is the case most of the time – the move-
ments of price and current profit are largely unrelated. Moreover, as we have demonstrated in 
our previous analyses of the mismatch thesis, the long-term growth rates of ‘financial capital’ 
(stocks and bonds) and the ‘real capital stock’ (measured in current dollars) correlate not posi-
tively but negatively (Bichler and Nitzan 2009, 2015a). What we would like to argue here is that 
this counter movement of the stock market and the so-called underlying economy reflects the 
sabotage underpinnings of accumulation.   
 
Employment Growth 
 
Begin with Figure 11. The chart shows two series. The first is our power index, smoothed as a 
10-year trailing average and plotted against the left log scale. The second is the annual growth 
rate of employment, which is also smoothed as a 10-year moving average, and which we plot 
against the right scale. Notice that the employment growth series is lagged five years. This lag 
means that, if there is a connection here, this series can be seen as a leading indicator or predictor 
of the power index. 
 
 
  
                                                 
23 The concept of strategic sabotage – the idea that rulers dominate society by strategically undermining, 
limiting and redirecting to their own ends the community’s autonomy, creativity and productivity – was 
first articulated by Thorstein Veblen (Cf. 1904, 1923). This concept is central to our work on the capitalist 
mode of power (Nitzan and Bichler 2009a: Ch. 12) and has been examined, researched and extended in 
numerous CasP publications (for an outline of works on the subject, see Bichler and Nitzan 2015b). 
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Figure 11 
The Power Index and Strategic Sabotage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The S&P 500 price splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock 
series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 
90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The wage rate splices hourly data for manufacturing 
production workers till 1946 with hourly data for nonfarm business-sector workers from 1947 onward. Shaded area 
denotes positive correlation. The last data points are 2016 for the power index and 2020 for strategic sabotage. 
  
SOURCE: The S&P 500 price is from Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1900 (series code: _SPXD) and from Global 
Insight (GI) from 1901 onward (series code: JS&PNS). The hourly wage rate splices the following series: Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online: hourly wages in manufacturing, all trades, 1865-1889 (series 
code: Ba4290), hourly earnings in manufacturing, all industries, 1890-1913 (series code: Ba4299), weekly earnings of 
production workers in manufacturing, 1914-1918 (series code: Ba4362), hourly earnings of production workers in 
manufacturing, 1919-1938 (series code: Ba4361); Global Insight (GI): average hourly earnings of production workers 
in manufacturing, 1939-1946, (series code: AHPMFNS); Conference Board through GI: average hourly compensation 
of all employees in the nonfarm business sector (series code: JRWSSNFE). Employment till 1947 is from Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online (series code: 
CivilianLaborForce_Employed_Total_Ba471_Thousand) and from 1948 from U.S. Department of Labour through GI 
(annual average of monthly series, series code: ENS@US). 
 
 
The reason we focus on employment growth is that it is a meaningful proxy from both the 
mismatch and power perspectives. From a mismatch viewpoint, employment growth is a direct 
measure of economic activity (unlike GDP growth, which is the outcome of that activity). From 
a power perspective, employment growth is an inverse proxy of strategic sabotage: it is one of 
the most crucial metrics of the wellbeing and sense of security of the underlying population, so 
to lower this proxy is to strategically sabotage most people.24 
 
                                                 
24 The inverted growth rate of employment, although central, is not the only form of sabotage (see footnote 
23). Many other processes serve to undermine the wellbeing and security of the underlying population – 
though incorporating them into our indicator might end up being a double-edge sword. While sharpening 
the analysis, they will likely make the indicator more complex, shorter in duration and difficult to apply 
in other countries.  
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Switching the Social Current 
 
Now, the thing that jumps out of the chart here is the remarkable 1939 reversal of the relation-
ship between the two indices: until 1939, employment growth and the power index were posi-
tively correlated – and then, suddenly, as if someone switched the social current, the relation-
ship turned negative.  
How is such overnight reversal even possible? The answer to this question requires much 
more research than we can offer here, but let us outline our own initial thinking about it. Recall 
that the 1930s experienced an MBM, and that this MBM was ultimately resolved by creorder-
ing the entire mode of power. The chief hallmark of this creordering was the rise of the Keynes-
ian welfare-warfare state. And one of the key pillars of Keynesianism was discretionary coun-
tercyclical economic policy – and specifically for our purpose here, countercyclical monetary 
policy. In our view, this dramatic shift toward discretionary countercyclical monetary policy 
might explain why the correlation between capitalized power and strategic sabotage suddenly 
inverted.  
 
Employment Growth and Monetary Policy 
 
Let us examine this hypothesis a bit more closely. Until 1939, the power and employment 
growth indices were tightly and positively correlated (recall that employment growth is an in-
verse proxy of sabotage). The reason was twofold. First, capitalized power and systemic fear, 
although declining, were still relatively high, so changes in stock prices moved closely with 
changes in current earnings, and therefore with changes in employment (profit and employ-
ment levels are positively correlated). Second, since there was no countercyclical monetary 
policy, this positive correlation was largely undisturbed.  
After 1939, though, capitalists started to expect government policy to mitigate the cycle, in 
part through countercyclical monetary policy. And since the cycle is driven by employment 
growth, they expected higher employment growth to bring about tighter money, higher interest 
rates and therefore lower capitalization. This expectation took a bit to materialize, but as Fig-
ure 12 shows, eventually it became self-fulfilling.  
The chart shows two series: the annual rate of growth of employment plotted against the 
left scale and the yield on 10-year government bonds on the right. We can see that, until the 
middle of the twentieth century, there was little or no connection between the two series (Pear-
son coefficient of –0.12). But from the early 1960s onward, employment growth has been a 
nearly perfect five-year leading predictor for interest rates: the lower the rate of growth of em-
ployment (and therefore the greater the strategic sabotage), the lower the subsequent rate of 
interest (with a Pearson correlation of +0.89). And since lower interest rates boost capitaliza-
tion, you can clearly see how strategic sabotage worked to fuel capitalized power.  
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Figure 12 
Employment Growth and the Rate of Interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Employment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online (series code: 
CivilianLaborForce_Employed_Total_Ba471_Thousand) and from 1948 from U.S. Department of Labour through GI 
(annual average of monthly series, series code: ENS@US). The yield on 10-year government bonds splices data from 
Global Financial Data (GFD) till 1953 and from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board through Global Insight (GI) from 
1954 onward (series code: RMGB10Y@US). 
 
 
From a Political Business Cycle to a CasP Policy Cycle 
 
During the early 1940s, Michal Kalecki wrote an important article in which he identified what 
he called the ‘political business cycle’ (Kalecki 1943). The business cycle, he argued, had been 
deeply politicized in more than one way, and was now increasingly driven by government pol-
icy. One of Kalecki’s main points was that expansionary policy boosts employment and wages 
as well as profits, and therefore serves the economic interests of both workers and capitalists. 
But the efficacy of such policy demonstrates that governments can replace capitalists in gener-
ating and maintaining prosperity, and that demonstration undermines the long-term political 
interest of capitalists in preserving their class rule. According to Kalecki, this contradiction 
between the economic and political interests of capitalists means that, when it comes to main-
taining full employment, capitalists are likely to sacrifice their economic interest in higher profit 
for their political interest in continued dominance. 
However – and here we come back to our own model – if we think of capital accumulation 
not as an economic activity, but as the capitalization of power, there is no sacrifice at all. The 
consequence of tighter policy may be lower employment growth and lower profit here and now 
– but, then, under normal circumstances, these short-term consequences have little or no bear-
ing on forward-looking capitalization. At the same time, while the immediate consequences of 
the policy in terms of employment and profit have little bearing on capitalization, the tools of 
the policy – and particularly the rate of interest – have a huge impact. As Figures 11 and 12 
BICHLER & NITZAN • A CasP Model of the Stock Market 
 
– 32 – 
 
www.bnarchives.net
-
(10-year trailing average, left)
(10-year trailing average,
5 years earlier, inverted, right)
indicate, intensified sabotage through lower employment growth has become a leading indica-
tor for lower interest rates down the road, and lower interest rates boost capitalized power.  
So what we end up with is not a narrow political business cycle à la Kalecki, but a broader 
CasP policy cycle. In this setup, the government is not some sort of exogenous distortion or an 
external alley but an integral component of the capitalization of power and the regulation of 
strategic sabotage. Moreover, there is no longer a conflict between the so-called political and 
economic interests of capitalists. Higher strategic sabotage keeps capitalists in the political 
driver’s seat. And while this sabotage may undermine current profits, it allows lower interest 
rates, which are far more important for the capitalization of their forward-looking power.  
Finally, in order to close our triangular model, Figure 13 shows the connection between 
strategic sabotage and systemic fear. This chart plots our systemic fear index on the left scale 
and the strategic sabotage index on the right scale. As before, both series are smoothed as 
10-year trailing averages, and the strategic sabotage index is lagged five years. Note that the 
right scale is inverted to make the correlation easier to visualize. 
 
Figure 13 
Strategic Sabotage and Systemic Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The S&P 500 price splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, insurance and railroad stock 
series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 
90-stock Composite (1926-1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The last data points are 2014 for the fear index and 
2016 for strategic sabotage. 
 
SOURCE: Employment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition Online (series code: 
CivilianLaborForce_Employed_Total_Ba471_Thousand) and from 1948 from U.S. Department of Labour through GI 
(annual average of monthly series, series code: ENS@US). Monthly S&P 500 price and EPS are from Robert J. Shiller’s 
online data archives 
(http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls, accessed on April 20, 2016). 
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Now, we already know that, since the 1940s, higher strategic sabotage has been associated, 
five years later, with higher capitalized power; but as noted, strategic sabotage also elicits re-
sistance, and resistance raises the systemic fear of capitalists – exactly what Figure 13 demon-
strates.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
In summary, we started with the conventional creed of the mismatch thesis, which (1) assumes 
that equity investors constantly try to price stocks to match the underlying economic funda-
mentals; (2) posits that they rarely if ever succeed in doing so; and (3) shows that their presumed 
failure is a superb predictor of future returns.  
We then proceeded to put this view back on its feet. We outlined a triangular CasP model 
of the stock market, showing that (1) mismatch valuation indices are in fact driven not by eco-
nomic productivity and utility, but by capitalized power; (2) capitalized power is dialectically 
intertwined with systemic fear; and (3) both capitalized power and systemic fear are driven by 
strategic sabotage. An important corollary of this model is the notion of a CasP policy cycle – 
the idea that government policy, insofar as it caters to the imperative of capitalized power, 
favours low employment growth in order to enable low rates of interest. 
And that observation leads us to the current historical moment. Over the past thirty years, 
U.S.-based capitalists (and others investing in U.S. equities) have managed to increase their 
capitalized power relative to the underlying population from record lows to record highs. In 
our view, this increase has been driven by two related processes: (1) a redistribution of income 
from non-capitalists to capitalists, along with a growing conviction that the resulting inequality 
could be maintained and even augmented in the future; and (2) mounting strategic sabotage in 
the form of lower employment growth. In terms of Equation 2, the first process meant a higher 
hype coefficient 𝐻 regarding the value of 𝑚. The second process has had a double impact: on 
the one hand, it assisted the first process by restricting wages and boosting profits, while, on 
the other, it enabled looser monetary policy and lower interest rates, thus helping to reduce the 
normal rate of return 𝑛𝑟𝑟 (there has been no discernable decline in earnings volatility during 
this period, so it is hard to draw meaningful conclusions about risk perceptions).  
These two processes were in turn underwritten by a major creordering of the underlying 
mode of power. Following the MBM of 1968-1981, capital has been progressively transnation-
alized, leading to the gradual disempowerment of the underlying domestic populations, the 
lowering of corporate and personal tax rates for high-net-worth individuals, the hijacking of 
macroeconomic policy for capitalized ends and the cajoling-forcing of pension funds and public 
assets into the stock market, among others consequences. But no spring can be pulled indefi-
nitely. Conflict-driven redistribution and lower interest rates have pushed capitalized power 
toward its historical asymptote, and this approach means that the United States – and maybe 
the world as a whole – is now facing a historical crossroad.  
Looking forward, we can see two possible trajectories. The less likely of the two is some 
version of Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1907), in which the U.S. ruling class breaks through its 
historical asymptote by imposing a mode of power much harsher than the one prevailing over 
the past two centuries. To sustain this new mode of power, the rulers would have to further 
redistribute income in their favour, domestically and/or globally, leading to historically un-
precedented levels of inequality. Moreover and crucially, they would have to cast this greater 
inequality as the ‘new normal’ (i.e., raise 𝑚 in Equation 2) as well as persuade investors that 
this greater inequality is here to stay (so as to prevent hype 𝐻 from collapsing). And while doing 
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all of that, they would also need to keep interests rates and profit volatility low in order to 
prevent the discount rate from rising significantly – a tall order in a world marked by greater 
sabotage, intensified violence and therefore greater instability. 
The other, and in our view more likely, possibility is that history will repeat itself, and that, 
sooner or later, the United States will experience another MBM. Now, if the past offers any 
guidance here, getting out of this MBM would require a major creordering of capitalism, do-
mestically and globally, including the role of governments in the capitalization process. And 
here we come to our final and perhaps most important point.  
Should it occur, this creordering is likely to unsettle the dominant dogma, and that unset-
tling might open a brief historical window for critical alternatives – new theories, novel exper-
iments in public planning and radical proposals to undo capitalized power in favour of direct 
democracy and autonomy (for our own modest proposal on this issue, see Debailleul, Bichler, 
and Nitzan 2016). However, if these alternative theories, experiments and policies are to have 
any traction, they must transcend the conventional fracturing of capitalism. They have to overcome 
the outdated notions that capitalism is a mode of consumption and production counted in utils 
or socially necessary abstract labour time; that politics is distinct from and ‘distorts/assists’ the 
economy, as the case may be; and that finance is somehow a mismatched reflection of an un-
derlying ‘real’ economy. To stick to these preconceptions is to stay locked within the capitalist 
mindset. And if we remain locked in this mindset, we are bound to find ourselves, once the 
MBM has come and gone, in a new, capitalist-creordered version of the very same system. 
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